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Introduction
Yasukuni Shrine remains a controversial site in contemporary Japan. In spite of its name, “peaceful 
country,” it has been associated with war, militarism, and social conflict throughout much of its 
history. Established initially to memorialize those soldiers who gave their lives in the battles fought for 
the restoration of imperial rule, it became the site to enshrine all of those who perished in Japan’s wars 
of imperial expansion from the late nineteenth century until 1945. During this period, the shrine was 
under the administrative control of the Ministries of Army and Navy, and financially supported by 
the government. Shinto priests were employed to conduct the services, but it is worth noting that the 
chief priest was often a military man.  Although the rituals conducted at the shrine followed Shinto 
protocol, the government regarded them as “non-religious” ceremonies that were necessary to provide 
oﬃcial recognition for those who sacrificed their life for the nation and Emperor. The annual events 
held at the shrine were used to inspire and mobilize the Japanese for war, celebrate military victories, 
and memorialize the war dead. 
　　Following Japan’s surrender in August 1945, the Allied Occupation rapidly transformed the 
status of the shrine. In response to the Shinto Directive (15 December 1945) issued by the Supreme 
Commander of Allied Powers, all shrines were “disestablished” and separated from government 
support and control. In order to survive in the new legal-political environment, Shinto shrines were 
forced to embrace a “religious” identity and required to register as religious corporations (shūkyō 
hōjin). Yasukuni Shrine priests completed this process in September 1946. This new legal status as 
voluntary religious organization is what constitutes the source of the multiple conflicts that have 
surrounded the shrine throughout the postwar period. The strict separation of religion and state 
required by the Shinto Directive was incorporated into the postwar Constitution (1947) in Articles 
20 and 89, and these have provided the legal framework for the debates surrounding Yasukuni Shrine 
for some seventy years.  
　　Since the end of the Occupation, public debate and legal battles have erupted around a number 
of issues related to the shrine. One of these is related to the eﬀorts of the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) to pass legislation (Yasukuni Jinja hōan 靖国神社法案) to restore government support of the 
shrine. Although LDP leaders presented six bills to the Diet between 1969 and 1974, these were all 
defeated. A second issue surrounds the constitutionality of oﬃcial visits to the shrine (kōshiki sanpai 
公式参拝) by prime ministers and cabinet members, and whether participation in ceremonies at 
Yasukuni Shrine in an oﬃcial capacity violates the principle of religion-state separation. A third issue 
is related to the continued enshrinement of the war dead by Yasukuni Shrine priests in the postwar 
period. These enshrinements were facilitated by information provided by the government’s Ministry 
of Health and Welfare and without the permission of the bereaved families concerned. In recent 
decades, Japanese Buddhists and Christians, as well as some foreigners (citizens of Taiwan and South 
Korea), have launched lawsuits against both Yasukuni Shrine and the Japanese government for alleged 
violation of Articles 20 and 89, and appealed to have the names of their family dead removed from 
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the shrine register (gōshi torikeshi 合祀取り消し). All three issues highlighted here are interrelated and 
draw our attention to the conflict over how religious freedom and religion-state separation should be 
interpreted and practiced in contemporary Japan. 
　　In this essay, I focus on the second issue in connection with Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s 
“oﬃcial visit” on 15 August 1985, a highly symbolic act, and examine the response of two public 
intellectuals, Umehara Takeshi (1925– ) and Sono Ayako (1931– ). Although these two prominent 
figures are often regarded as “conservative” or “nationalistic,” they both critically engaged the pro-
Yasukuni Shrine position advanced by Prime Minister Nakasone’s administration in the mid-1980s.1 
The positions of Umehara and Sono represented “minority opinions” at the time, but the concerns 
they raised have become a part of the public discourse in the debates surrounding Yasukuni Shrine 
over the past several decades. 
　　Umehara, a graduate of Kyoto University, is a well-known Buddhist philosopher who has had a 
distinguished academic career, which has included faculty appointments at Ritsumeikan University and 
Kyoto City University of Arts, where he also served as president in the mid-1970s. He was the founding 
Director of the International Research Center for Japanese Studies, a position he held from 1987 to 
1995. His collected works were published by Shōgakukan (2002–2003) in a series of twenty volumes. 
His influence extends beyond the academic world. Many of his books are popular volumes aimed at a 
wider audience, and his public role is also evident from his numerous essays and editorials published in 
newspapers and magazines, and through his involvement as a leader in the Article 9 Association (Kyū Jō 
no Kai 九条の会), which he and some other prominent intellectuals organized in 2004. 
　　The second figure, Sono Ayako, is a Roman Catholic and graduate of Sacred Heart University 
in Tokyo. She is widely known as the author of best-selling novels and volumes of essay collections, 
and as a regular columnist for conservative magazines and newspapers (such as Sankei shinbun). 
From 1996–2005 she served as chairperson of the Nippon Foundation, a philanthropic organization 
established by Sasakawa Ryōichi in 1962 to support a range of domestic and international 
humanitarian activities. She has had a close association with the Liberal Democratic Party as an 
advisor for many years and served on the Ad Hoc Educational Committee of the Japanese Ministry 
of Education, and most recently on the education reform panel organized by Prime Minister Abe’s 
administration in 2013.2  
Background to Nakasone’s “Official Visit” to Yasukuni
Prime Ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine resumed shortly after the Treaty of Peace with Japan was 
signed in San Francisco (8 September 1951). Yoshida Shigeru, in fact, visited on 19 October 1951, 
1  Carol Gluck (1993, p. 72), for example, observes the close relationship between Umehara and former Prime 
Minister Nakasone, whose vision for “internationalization” was linked to “the revival of a cultural nationalism 
unencumbered by remembrance of the wartime past.” Similarly, Margaret Sleeboon’s treatment of the founding of 
Nichibunken in Academic Nations in China and Japan (2004, p.114), includes a quotation from the co-authored 
work by Nakasone and Umehara (1996, p. 80), in which Umehara acknowledges that his critics on the left viewed 
him to be an “ultranationalist” like Nakasone and regarded Nichibunken as “an organ of nationalist propaganda.” 
2  Sono’s close association with the government and ruling Liberal Democratic Party is apparent from the personal 
information provided on the government site: http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/m-magazine/backnumber/2002/sono.html.
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almost six months before the Occupation oﬃcially ended. While many prime ministers visited over 
the following decades, they usually explained that their visits were conducted in a “private” capacity 
(shijin no shikaku 私人の資格) or avoided clearly indicating whether the visits had been personal or 
oﬃcial. Conservative leaders within the Liberal Democratic Party, however, were adamant that oﬃcial 
visits be resumed and fully recognized as such. This issue was finally addressed head on during the 
period Nakasone served as the Prime Minister (1982–1987). Prime Minister Nakasone visited the 
shrine on 15 August 1983 and the following year, but whether these visits were made as a “private 
citizen” or as a “public official” remained ambiguous (although he did sign the shrine’s registry as 
Prime Minister). 
　　It was in this context that in August 1984, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujinami Takao convened 
a private Advisory Committee (“Kakuryō no Yasukuni Jinja sanpai mondai ni kannsuru kondankai” 
閣僚の靖国神社公式参拝に関する懇談会) to gather information from a range of experts on 
how Japanese people viewed the shrine and to address the lingering problem of whether or not 
official shrine visits by the Prime Minister and Cabinet members constituted a violation of the 
Constitution.3 The composition of the fifteen-member advisory committee was diverse and included 
public intellectuals, a company president, lawyers, a former Supreme Court judge, professors of 
constitutional law and philosophy, a literary critic, and a novelist. 
　　The committee met some twenty-one times over the course of a year to deliberate these issues. 
Given the make-up of the committee, it is not surprising that a consensus was never reached. While 
some firmly argued that “oﬃcial visits” by the prime minister would be a violation of religion-state 
separation and oﬀered other reasons why they were inadvisable, the majority opinion submitted to 
Fujinami in the final report endorsed the view that these visits constituted legitimate behavior on the 
part of government representatives.4 On 14 August 1985, Fujinami issued a public statement that 
presented the majority opinion—and the government’s preferred view—that paying homage at the 
shrine would not constitute a violation of the constitutional separation of religion and state if Prime 
Ministers and Cabinet members made it clear that their actions were simply expressions of  respect 
toward the war dead and without religious significance. This could be achieved, he explained, by 
avoiding the Shinto rituals usually performed on such occasions.5  
　　The majority position and final recommendation of Fujinami’s committee was based in part 
on a consideration of the 1977 Supreme Court Decision (13 July) on whether the use of municipal 
funds for the Tsu City Jichinsai (grounds purification rite) in 1965 constituted a violation of Article 
20 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled that if the purpose of the activity (kōi no mokuteki 
3  The record of these meetings and the materials reviewed by the advisory committee in 1984–1985 are available 
online, and a part of the larger collection of Yasukuni Shrine-related documents in the National Diet Library (第四
期 昭和五〇(一九七五)年から平成一二(二〇〇〇)年まで (三)「閣僚の靖国神社参拝に関する懇談会」関係資料); 
see: http://dl.ndl.go.jp/view/download/digidepo_999337_po_1027-1126.pdf?contentNo=34.
4 On the divided opinions of the committee, see Hardacre (1989, p. 151), and Reid (1991, p. 50, n. 31).
5  In this statement, Fujinami recognized the concerns of some critics who claimed that shrine visits by oﬃcials will 
lead to a “revival of prewar State Shintō and militarism” (senzen no Kokka Shintō oyobi gunkoku shugi no fukkatsu 
戦前の国家神道及び軍国主義の復活). He indicated that care would be taken so that does not happen, but 
made no reference to the recommendation that a religiously “neutral” memorial site be created as an alternative to 
Yasukuni Shrine. His statement is available online: http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/tuitou/dai2/siryo1_7.html (last 
accessed 2 October 2015).
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行為の目的) was not religious, and the action did not aim to support or promote one particular 
religion (shūkyō ni taisuru enjo, jochō, sokushin 宗教に対する援助、助長、促進) or involve coercion 
or interference (appaku, kanshō nado 圧迫、干渉等) in the free practice of another religion, then 
the activity would not constitute a violation of Article 20. In short, the majority opinion and 
recommendation to Fujinami was based on the expansion of this judicial interpretation from jichinsai 
to include kōshiki sanpai.6 
　　On 15 August, Prime Minister Nakasone visited Yasukuni Shrine and closely followed the 
approach recommended by Fujinami. He went directly to the main hall, bowed once (本殿におい
て一礼する方式), but did not observe the traditional Shintō protocol, which normally includes a 
purification ritual, an oﬀering a sprig of the sakaki 榊 tree, and the usual ritual process of two bows, 
clapping of the hands twice, and a final bow (nirei, nihakushu, ichirei 二礼二拍手一礼). Rather than 
making a direct financial donation, Nakasone simply used public funds to purchase the flowers that 
were oﬀered on the occasion of his visit. The general public may have been oblivious to these fine 
distinctions between “religious” and “non-religious” observances and simply regarded Nakasone as a 
“pro-Yasukuni” nationalist when he made the visit accompanied by most of his Cabinet members. 
The head priest, Matsudaira Nagayoshi, however, was incensed that the traditional rites had been 
abandoned and regarded Nakasone’s visit as a sign of disrespect to the kami enshrined there.7 
　　In spite of the eﬀorts by Fujinami and Nakasone to redefine “oﬃcial visits” as civic and non-
religious and therefore constitutional, critics were hardly persuaded given the fact that the ritual 
respect accorded the war dead occurred in an institution registered with the government as a religious 
corporation (shūkyō hōjin). Within Japan many intellectuals and religious leaders expressed their 
strong opposition to the Prime Minister’s initiative, and domestic lawsuits were launched against 
Nakasone and the government for violating the constitutional separation of religion and state.8 
International criticism also appeared in newspapers and media reports in China, North Korea, South 
Korea, Singapore, and the Soviet Union.9 The negative press and reaction was such that Nakasone 
canceled his planned visit to the shrine the following year. As a result, “oﬃcial” prime ministerial visits 
to the shrine were avoided for over a decade and the debate subsided.
6  This explanation is found on p. 98 of the final report: http://www.ndl.go.jp/jp/diet/publication/document 
/2007/200704/1027-1126.pdf.
7  More details about this incident and Matsudaira’s response may be found in Yasukuni Jinja sengo hishi: A-kyū senpan 
o gōshi shita otoko 靖国神社戦後秘史: A級戦犯を合祀した男, Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 2007, pp. 76–78. 
NHK News coverage of the 15 August 1989 visit is available at the following site, which includes Nakasone’s 
clear explanation to reporters that he was engaging in an “official” (kōshiki sanpai) visit as Prime Minister and 
it was an appropriate action for Cabinet members: http://cgi2.nhk.or.jp/archives/tv60bin/detail/index.cgi?das 
_id=D0009030198_00000.
8  As it turns out, the two courts adjudicating these cases followed the reasoning of the justices in the 1977 Supreme 
Court Decision regarding the Tsu City jichinsai case mentioned above and ruled against the plaintiffs. In the 
decisions of both the Osaka District Court (November 1989) and the Fukuoka Court (December 1989) it was 
determined that Nakasone’s actions had not violated Article 20 since the religious freedom of the plaintiﬀs had not 
be infringed upon in any way. As David Reid has noted, these rulings indicate “that ‘separation issues’ have been 
reduced to ‘religious freedom” issues. Unless coercion can be proved, there is no religious freedom issue, and if there 
is no religious freedom issue, there is no separation issue” (see David Reid 1991, p. 51).
9  See Breen (2010, pp. 284–86) for more detailed discussion of the negative international reaction to Nakasone’s visit.
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Critical Perspectives on “Official Visits”
Several months after Prime Minister Nakasone’s controversial visit, the “minority” perspectives of 
some advisory committee members were published in the November 1985 issue of Jurist, which was 
devoted to the problem of “oﬃcial visits to Yasukuni Shrine.” While their alternative views had been 
referred to in the report submitted to Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujinami, this publication provided 
a fuller treatment of their arguments against the “majority” recommendation that official visits 
to Yasukuni be resumed. This special issue contained articles by both Umehara and Sono, which 
explained their concerns about Yasukuni Shrine and government support for “oﬃcial visits.”10 Here I 
provide a brief synopsis of their positions.
Umehara Takeshi’s Perspective
In his article entitled “The Merits and Demerits of Official Visits to Yasukuni Shrine,” Umehara 
oﬀered a pragmatic approach to the issue and identified some key problems associated with shrine 
visits by government representatives.11 His essay begins with the acknowledgement that he and 
some of the other members of the Advisory Committee—along with most constitutional scholars—
regarded “oﬃcial visits” to Yasukuni Shrine as a clear violation of the separation of religion and state. 
One member of the committee, however, opposed the strong focus on the current Constitution—seen 
as a foreign imposition by General MacArthur—and argued that it should not be regarded as the basis 
for final arbitration of the issue; rather, in his view, the Constitution needed to be revised as soon as 
possible.12 Umehara, however, expressed appreciation for the postwar Constitution—regardless of its 
“foreign” connections—since it brought about significant democratic reforms and helped to liberate 
Japan from a misguided nationalism. After expressing his opposition to any hasty revision of the 
Constitution, he focuses his attention on other reasons why oﬃcial visits should either be “promoted” 
or “avoided,” and argues that the “merits” and “demerits” for such visits should be reviewed and a 
decision made after the sum total is calculated. Although this was the approach he proposed to the 
Advisory Committee, the majority were not persuaded and the Committee’s final recommendation, 
he explains, was based on the “mood” among the members after a rather “heated discussion.”13 
　　Umehara highlights two potential “merits” of prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni. Firstly, if such 
visits were resumed it would satisfy the longing of many bereaved families (Nihon izokukai) for proper 
recognition of their deceased family members by the government. While Yasukuni  has memorialized 
10  This special issue also contained essays by some of the others who served on the advisory committee as well as 
Murakami Shigeyoshi, a well-known historian and critic of Yasukuni Shrine and the system of State Shinto. 
11  “Kōshiki sanpai no meritto to demeritto” 公式参拝のメリットとデメリット. Jurist ジュリスト 848 (1985), pp. 10–16.
12  Umehara (1985, p.10). Although Umehara does not refer to this committee member by name, I suspect that it was 
Etō Jun (1932–1999), a “pro-Yasukuni” literary critic who until his death provided intellectual support for those in 
the government promoting Yasukuni Shrine and the particular “memory” of the war as represented by Yūshūkan. 
Ann Sherif (2007, p. 141) has noted Etō’s disappointment with what he felt was an over-emphasis on the legal 
and constitutional dimension of the Yasukuni issue and lack of attention to “cultural issues” in the Committee’s 
deliberations.
13  The Japanese here is: Nihon de wa, sanseiha to hantaiha ga gekiron shita sue ni nantonaku mu-do ni yotte kimatte 
shimau koto ga ōi 日本では、賛成派と反対派が 激論した末に何となくムードによってきまってしまうことが多
い (Umehara 1985, p. 11).
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them as heroic spirits (eirei 英霊), the fact the prime ministers in the postwar period have often been 
willing to visit the shrine only in a “private capacity” is regarded as a slight by bereaved families who 
lost a family member in wars fought on behalf of the Emperor and nation. Umehara recalls that 
during the months the Committee was deliberating these issues, he received many thousands of cards 
from individuals and families expressing their hope that the meaning of their deaths and the deep 
loss they experienced would be fully understood and officially recognized. After the Committee’s 
recommendation that “official visits” be resumed was made public, he then received many cards 
expressing appreciation. In light of this kind of popular response, he concludes that by addressing the 
felt needs of the bereaved families is clearly one “merit” in favor of the majority position on oﬃcial 
visits.
　　Umehara also acknowledged a second possible merit—emphasized by a number of those on the 
Committee—which is that national defense would be enhanced if oﬃcial visits were resumed. If the 
government does not show proper respect, honor, and gratitude toward those who sacrificed their lives 
for the nation in the past, it would be unreasonable to expect citizens to willingly oﬀer their lives for 
their country in a future time of national emergency. While Umehara suggests that there are probably 
counter arguments that could be made against this line of reasoning, he concedes that many would 
likely regard this as a “merit” and an additional reason to support oﬃcial visits to Yasukuni.
　　In Umehara’s view, these “merits” are outnumbered by the “demerits,” which he gives more 
detailed treatment. The first problem is the potential impact of official shrine visits on Japan’s 
international relations. Writing at a time when Japan was in the midst of diﬃcult trade negotiations 
and conflict with the United States and Europe, Umehara felt that maintaining friendly relations 
with Japan’s closest neighbors—Korea and China—would be vitally important for economic stability 
in the future. Although one or two members of the committee shared his concerns, most were 
“utterly indiﬀerent” to the possibility that prime ministerial visits would damage Japan’s international 
relations. Given what Yasukuni Shrine represents to China and Korea, however, Umehara anticipated 
that oﬃcial visits by prime ministers would lead to the negative reactions and diplomatic problems, 
which, in fact, did occur following Nakasone’s August visit. 
　　The second problem or demerit has to do with the particular form of Shinto institutionalized 
by Yasukuni Shrine, which he regards as a distortion of authentic Japanese tradition. Umehara 
confesses that for several decades he struggled with the question of whether the ultranationalism 
of the wartime period was a natural and inevitable expression of Japan’s spiritual heritage or based 
upon a misunderstanding of that spiritual tradition by right-wing thinkers. If it does in fact represent 
authentic Japanese tradition, then he worries whether it is possible to derive spiritual principles 
from this tradition that can provide the foundation for Japan to maintain a peaceful existence in the 
international world today.14   
　　Umehara explains that after three decades of research, he reached the conclusion that Yasukuni 
Shrine—its beliefs and practices—deviates from Japanese tradition in significant ways. For example, 
the exclusive memorialization of the war dead by Yasukuni Shrine—and only those who died on 
behalf of Japan—he views as a post-Meiji development that departs significantly from ancient 
Japanese tradition and practice. Prior to the formation of State Shinto under the influence of the 
14 Umehara 1985, p. 12.
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Hirata School of Shinto, he argues, traditional care of the dead included both Shinto and Buddhist 
rites, the latter closely associated with both the care of the ancestors (shirei no chinkon 死霊の鎮魂) 
and the pacification of dangerous spirits (onryō shizume 怨霊鎮め).15  
　　While he acknowledges that Yasukuni Shrine provides some traditional Shinto rites for the care 
of the dead, its monopoly over the war dead—which eliminates Buddhist ritual care—constitutes an 
abandonment of authentic Japanese tradition. He goes on to explain that the development of State 
Shinto from the early Meiji period was due to the influence of the Hirata School and its concern to 
purify native traditions from foreign influences. This shaped the government policies that abolished 
the place of Buddhism and led to the disintegration of the natural co-existence and reverence for both 
kami and buddhas, which he claims characterized life in pre-modern Japan. 
　　According to Umehara, the development of State Shinto from the Meiji period not only 
damaged Buddhism, but also had negative repercussions for the Shinto tradition. The authority and 
control over shrines by priestly families was replaced by government administration. Furthermore, 
many local traditions and practices were often eliminated as Shinto was reorganized around Ise Jingū 
and the ancestral deities of the Imperial household, Meiji Shrine and the kami of the Meiji Emperor, 
and Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrined the deified soldiers who gave their lives for the emperor 
and nation. Umehara argues that this was not the structure of traditional Shinto, but a new form 
reconstructed (kaizō 改造) in relation to nationalism. The key “demerit” of kōshiki sanpai, in short, 
is that it represents a tacit approval of a distorted version of Japanese tradition that will give people 
both inside and outside Japan the impression that the government is seeking to revive or resurrect the 
old wartime nationalism that was supported by State Shinto. The narrow nationalism supported by 
oﬃcial visits to Yasukuni Shrine, he concludes, is misguided and inappropriate for Japan to function 
as a member of international society today.16  
　　Given that Yasukuni Shrine represents a distortion of authentic Japanese spiritual tradition, 
Umehara proposed that a new memorial site (matsuri no basho 祭りの場所)  be established to honor 
the war dead as an alternative to Yasukuni Shrine. This would be a site where people of any religious 
affiliation could conduct memorial services according to their own faith tradition, and it would 
exclude the war criminals that Yasukuni Shrine “arbitrarily enshrined” (katte ni gōshi shita 勝手に合祀
した).17 He suggests that it could also serve as a memorial site for others who gave their lives in public 
service in the postwar period, including, for example, members of the Self-Defense Force (Jieitai).18 
While some might suggest that reform of the current war memorial site are possible, Umehara quotes 
a well-known biblical text—“new wine is put into fresh wineskins” (Matthew 9:17)—to conclude his 
argument that only an entirely new site unencumbered by the problems associated with Yasukuni 
Shrine will ever be regarded as an acceptable and legitimate memorial institution by the larger 
Japanese public and Japan’s neighbors in Asia. 
15 Umehara 1985, pp. 14–15.
16 Umehara 1985, p. 15.
17  It should be noted that Yasukuni conducted these enshrinements under pressure from the government and with a 
sense of responsibility to fulfill the promises made to the soldiers when they departed for war. 
18 Umehara 1985, p. 16. 
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Sono Ayako’s Perspective
Sono similarly argues that a new religiously neutral memorial site needs to be established as an 
alternative to Yasukuni, but for some other reasons not addressed by Umehara.19 At the outset, Sono 
makes it clear that she regards “oﬃcial visits” by prime ministers and cabinet members to be a clear 
violation of the Constitution. Given that Yasukuni was registered as a religious corporation (shūkyō 
hōjin) in 1946, and conducts its rituals according to Shinto tradition, it is impossible to argue that 
it is a religiously neutral site that simply observes the ancient Japanese custom of spirit pacification 
(irei 慰霊). In her view, the notion that what goes on in the shrine precincts is either non-religious or 
religiously neutral is something that will never be accepted from the international commonsense point 
of view.20  
　　Sono notes the argument made by some—that the only reason Yasukuni became a shūkyō 
hōjin and was clearly identified as a Shinto institution—was simply as a strategy to survive the 
particular circumstances of the Occupation. Sono reasons that if that is, in fact, the case, the shrine 
administrators could end the Shinto monopoly and make arrangements so that all religions could 
conduct their own services within precincts. If arrangements for equal access were guaranteed, she 
would not be opposed to the preservation of the sanctuary (shinden 神殿), or Great Torii, as it stands 
nor to the continued management of the facility by Shinto priests. The fact that this kind of change 
would never be accepted is clear evidence that the shrine is biased toward one particular religion 
(akirana ni tokutei shūkyō ni katayotteiru 明らかに特定宗教に偏っている), which means that 
“oﬃcial visits” to the shrine as it operates today would violate the Constitution by giving support or 
endorsement to one particular religious tradition.21 
　　The normalization of such “oﬃcial visits,” she also fears, could lead to restrictions on religious 
freedom or the freedom to oppose participation in rites of any kind. If “oﬃcial visits” are defined as 
the duty of all those holding public oﬃce, it could lead to situations of coercion in which individuals 
with other religious convictions are required to participate in Shinto rites.22 While she believes that 
prime ministers and government oﬃcials should express their gratitude and remember those who gave 
their lives for the nation, Yasukuni Shrine remains a problematic site for this to be a duty of those 
holding public oﬃce. 
19  Sono 1985, pp. 32–34. My analysis of Sono’s changing views of Yasukuni Shrine here overlaps with John Breen’s 
earlier treatment; see his “The Danger is Ever Present: Catholic Critiques of the Yasukuni Shrine in Postwar Japan,” 
Japan Mission Journal 63:2 (2009), pp. 111–22; “Popes, Bishops and War Criminals: Reflections on Catholics and 
Yasukuni in Postwar Japan,” Asia-Pacific Journal 9-3-10 (1 March 2010), online at: http://www.japanfocus.org 
/-John-Breen/3312; and “Voices of Rage: Six Paths to the Problem of Yasukuni,” in Politics and Religion in Modern 
Japan: Red Sun, Shite Lotus, ed. Roy Starrs (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). Sono is, of course, just one well-known 
Catholic example. For consideration of the Yasukuni stances of other Catholics, including Fr. Bruno Bitter, former 
Prime Minister Asō Tarō, Fr. Nishiyama Toshihiko, and Kevin Doak, see Breen’s studies cited above and Mullins 
(2010, 2013). 
20  The Japanese here is “kokusaiteki jōshiki kara ittemo fukanō to omowaremasu” 国際的常識から言っても不可能と思
われます (Sono 1985, p. 32).
21 Sono 1985, p. 32.
22  The Japanese here is “Shinkyō no jiyū no shingai ni naru ke-su o hikiokoshikanenai to omowaremasu” 信教の自由の侵
害になるケースを引き起こしかねないと思われます (Sono 1985, p. 32); on this point, see also Breen (2010, p. 6).
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　　To avoid these potential problems, Sono concludes that it is necessary to construct a new 
memorial site or kinenbyō (記念廟) for the war dead. This would need to be a religiously neutral space 
where people and religious organizations could freely conduct memorial services according to their 
own tradition. It is only in such a place that government oﬃcials will be able to participate in oﬃcial 
visits without impediments or controversy. 
Post-Nakasone Developments: Conciliatory Efforts and Resurgent Neonationalism
Given the domestic and international reaction to his 1985 Yasukuni Shrine visit, Nakasone avoided 
making another visit while in oﬃce.  It would be eleven years before another Prime Minister would 
visit the shrine, and it was during this moratorium period that some political leaders made significant 
efforts to actually improve diplomatic relations through the public acknowledgment of Japan’s 
imperial past. It was in the short three-year interlude (1993–1996) to the postwar domination by 
the Liberal Democratic Party that several leaders of the coalition government initiated “apology 
diplomacy.” Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei made a statement and apology in response to the 
study on the “comfort women” issue (4 August 1993), and both Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro 
(23 August 1993) and Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi (15 August 1995) made apologies for the 
pain and suﬀering caused by Japan’s military aggression and colonial rule.23  
　　This public recognition of responsibility of Japan as the aggressor (kagaisha) towards its neighbors 
in Asia represented a significant shift in orientation among some political leaders. This admission 
clearly challenged the revisionist narrative of Japan’s imperial past celebrated at Yasukuni Shrine 
and promoted by Yūshūkan, the shrine’s war museum, as a glorious effort to “liberate Asia” from 
Western imperialism. It is not surprising that these public admissions of guilt generated a critical 
response from the far right. Reflecting on these oﬃcial apologies, for example, Ishihara Shintarō, the 
ardent nationalist and Governor of Tokyo, stated how appalled he was by Hosokawa’s “ignorance of 
history that allowed him to declare that our war in the Pacific was a war of aggression,” and stated 
that “Murayama’s sentimentalism about ‘painful repentance and heartfelt apologies,’ amounted to a 
desecration of our nation’s history.”24  
　　Murayama’s resignation and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine on his 
birthday in late July 1996—some eleven years since Nakasone’s controversial visit—clearly marked 
the end to this brief conciliatory period and the beginning of a new period of nationalism. Elsewhere 
I have analyzed in some detail the significant surge in a range of neonationalistic initiatives over the 
past two decades, which were facilitated by the widespread sense of social crisis that followed the 1995 
23  These statements are available on the oﬃcial sites below: Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei’s statement on the 
result of the study on the issue of “comfort women” (4 August 4 1993), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund 
/state9308.html; Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro’s Policy Speech to the 127th Session of the National Diet (23 
August 1993), http://japan.kantei.go.jp/127.html; and Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi’s Statement “On the 
occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war’s end” (15 August 1995), http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm 
/murayama/9508.html.
24  Ishihara made this statement following a visit to Yasukuni Shrine in August 2001. Quoted in John Nathan, Japan 
Unbound (2004), p.170. 
154
Public Intellectuals, Neonationalism, and the Politics of Yasukuni Shrine
and 2011 disaster years.25 These include the renewed eﬀorts by LDP leadership to promote oﬃcial 
Yasukuni Shrine visits, to restore and strengthen patriotic education, and their plans to revise the 
Constitution. These are all related to a larger “restorationist vision” embraced by the far right of the 
LDP and its aﬃliated groups, such as Shinto Seiji Renmei and Nippon Kaigi, and the movement to 
“recover” what was destroyed by the reforms enacted during the Allied Occupation of Japan (1945–52). 
　　Oﬃcial visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Ministers, Cabinet members, and Diet members have 
increased markedly over the past two decades. This significant surge is closely related to the leadership 
of Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō, who visited a number of times between 2001 and 2006, and 
that of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, who visited on 26 December 2013. There was considerable 
domestic opposition to these visits and court cases were launched against both Koizumi and Abe. In 
the cases brought against Koizumi, the Fukuoka District Court in April 2004 and the Osaka High 
Court in September 2005 ruled that the plaintiffs’ legal interests had not been infringed upon by 
the Prime Minister’s visits; however, the two judges involved in these cases did oﬀer their opinions—
obiter dictum—that the Prime Minister’s patronage of Yasukuni Shrine had violated Article 20 of 
the Constitution. Their additional statements were “non-binding,” as John Breen points out, but the 
media coverage of these rulings generated some misunderstanding among the public.26 The two cases 
against Prime Minister Abe are still in process.
　　These prime ministerial visits—as in the case of Nakasone—have again been followed by strong 
condemnations from South Korea and China, and even a public expression of disappointment was 
made by the United States in response to Abe’s most recent visit. Although Prime Minister Abe has 
restrained himself from making another oﬃcial visit, he continues to make oﬀerings to the shrine—as 
recently as the fall festival in October 2016—and even though these oﬀering are made with “personal” 
funds (shihi 私費),  Foreign Ministry oﬃcials from China and Korea have still responded critically 
and repeatedly to urge Japanese leaders to reflect deeply on the history Japan’s aggression and make a 
clear break from this militaristic past. 
Resisting and Riding the Wave of Neonationalism: 
Some Concluding Comparative Observations
Japan appears to be stuck where it was three decades ago when Nakasone made his controversial visit 
to Yasukuni Shrine. History is now repeating itself and a resolution to the conflict over Yasukuni 
Shrine remains unlikely for the foreseeable future. The proposal by Umehara and Sono to build an 
alternative site to memorialize the war dead has never gained much public support. It did receive 
some serious attention from scholars,27 and in 2009 Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio indicated that 
he was in favor of restarting discussions about this possibility, but his time in oﬃce was too short 
25  Here I am referring to the “double disaster” of 1995—the Awaji-Hanshin earthquake in January and the Aum 
Shinrikyō subway sarin gas attack in March—and the 11 March 2011 “triple disaster” of the earthquake, tsunami, 
and nuclear meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. See Mullins (2012, 2015a, 2015b). 
26  See Breen (2011, pp. 282–283) for a more detailed discussion of the obiter dictum following the Osaka and Fukuoka 
Court decisions. 
27  For example, see the collection of essays edited by the International Institute for the Study of Religion, Atarashii 
tsuitō shisetsu wa hitsuyō ka 新しい追悼施設は必要か (2004). 
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to pursue it.28 Preparing an alternative and religiously neutral memorial site might rationally solve 
the constitutional issues surrounding religion-state separation and the international foreign relations 
nightmare associated with “oﬃcial visits” to a shrine that memorializes war criminals and maintains 
an aﬃliated war museum (Yūshūkan) that celebrates a revisionist history. Some have proposed that 
the nearby Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery, which memorializes over three hundred thousand 
unidentified war dead, be expanded as an alternative.29 The fact remains, however, that the majority of 
Japanese expressing concern about the proper remembrance of the war dead are emotionally attached 
to Yasukuni Shrine and regard it as the only legitimate site for spiritual communion with deceased 
family members and fallen comrades. 
　　Over the course of three decades, Umehara has maintained his critical stance and continued to 
express opposition to government support for Yasukuni Shrine. In 2004, for example, in response to 
Prime Minister Koizumi’s persistence in visiting Yasukuni Shrine, Umehara published an editorial in 
Asahi shinbun (20 April 2004), criticizing the Prime Minister for his refusal to “listen to the opinions 
of experts and to reflect seriously upon his own biases.” “It is deplorable,” he continued, “that Prime 
Minister Koizumi seems bent on repeating the example of Prime Minister Tōjō, a man devoid of 
reason, who with no small amount of bravado launched a reckless war and refused to end it even after 
defeat had become all but certain, bringing untold suﬀering upon the Japanese people.”30   
　　In Kami goroshi no Nihon (2006) and Nihon no dentō to wa nani ka (2010), Umehara provided 
a more detailed treatment of his criticism that Yasukuni Shrine represents a distortion of authentic 
Japanese tradition, an argument he expands to include the Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyōiku 
chokugo, 1890). In his view, misguided leaders have idealized this document as the basis for 
educational reform and the promotion of patriotism in contemporary Japan. Umehara rejects these 
attempts to revive key elements of what he refers to as Tennōkyō, which characterized wartime Japan. 
He argues that all of this was part of a manufactured system rooted in the narrow-minded and 
intolerant orientation of the Kokugaku movement that influenced the reshaping of Japanese tradition 
from the Meiji period.31 In developing his alternative moral vision, Umehara draws on Buddhist 
ethical teachings and the Shinto traditions that pre-dated Tennōkyō (i.e., State Shinto). 
　　Umehara has been very critical of the more recent movement to revise the Fundamental 
Education Law (Kyōiku kihon hō) and signed a joint declaration to that eﬀect on 18 July 2002. This 
statement asserted that the law in its current form, in fact, provided the ideals appropriate to nurture 
individuals for the twenty-first century. 32 The revisions proposed by Abe’s government were seen to 
be a reversion to the wartime education system that diminished individual rights and involved various 
forms of coercion. Abe succeeded in passing the legislation to revise the Fundamental Education Law 
28 Reported in the Asahi shinbun, 11 August 2009.
29  Since Chidorigafuchi has no oﬃcial religious aﬃliation it would pass the test of “neutrality,” but Sono (1985, pp. 
32–33) suggested in her earlier statement that it was too small to serve as an adequate alternative site. 
30  The English version of Umehara’s piece was published as “Oﬃcial Visit to Yasukuni Shrine Invite the Revenge of 
Reason,” trans. Steven Platzer, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 2, issue 4, 2004.
31 Umehara 2006, pp. 33–34. 
32  The declaration (seimei 声明), was entitled “Kyōiku to bunka o sekai ni hirakareta mono ni: Kyōiku kihonhō ‘kaiaku’ 
ni hantai suru yobikake” (教育と文化を世界に開かれたものに: 教育基本法「改悪」に反対する呼びかけ); available 
online: http://www.ne.jp/asahi/kyokasho/net21/gyoji_020718kihonhou.htm.
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in 2006, and coercion has returned to public schools as a result. Today the use of the the Kimigayo 
(national anthem) and Hinomaru (national flag) are no longer voluntary, and teaching staff face 
disciplinary action if they fail to comply with the directives from the government and local school 
principals to lead students in singing the anthem for oﬃcial school ceremonies. 
　　Umehara was a founding member of the Article 9 Association—along with Ōe Kenzaburō and 
several other intellectuals—and he has opposed the current government’s “reinterpretation” of the 
“Peace” Constitution and its plans for revision. His editorial in the Kyōto shinbun, “Itsuka kita michi” 
(いつか来た道), revealed a broader concern that the orientation and direction of the Abe government 
will lead Japan to repeat the mistakes that took the nation on the path of militarism and war from the 
late nineteenth century until 1945.33 It is his generation—those who actually experienced the war—
who seem most concerned to preserve the postwar Constitution, and Umehara fears many younger 
Japanese lack the historical understanding needed to resist the agenda being advanced by the Abe 
government.
　　In stark contrast to Umehara’s critical stance, Sono has apparently had a conversion (tenkō 転向) 
of sorts and has fully embraced the neonationalistic agenda. Her new perspective was made public 
in her 2005 article, “I will visit Yasukuni Shrine” (Yasukuni ni mairimasu).34 In this piece, there is no 
mention of her earlier proposal for an alternative site; rather, she emphasizes how important it is to 
remember those who sacrificed themselves for the nation at Yasukuni Shrine. She also expresses her 
view that foreign governments should not play role in deciding on whether or not one visits Yasukuni 
Shrine (i.e., Japan should not “be bullied by China’s interference in domestic aﬀairs”). The proposal 
that Class A war criminals be removed from the Shrine is also rejected by Sono as this would be 
tantamount “to setting oneself up as a human to pass judgment just like God,” something she regards 
as a “frightening position.”35 
　　In this article and, again, in her book, Kokka no toku, Sono reports that she now visits Yasukuni 
annually with her husband, Miura Shumon, who felt compelled to return on account of the two 
classmates he lost during the war. The promise many soldiers made before departing to the frontlines 
of battle, “Shindara Yasukuni de aou” (死んだら靖国で会おう), is regarded by Miura and many other 
veterans as a binding covenant between the living and the dead. Sono’s empathy for these veterans 
feelings and experiences moved her to embrace a positive view of the shrine, which she now believes 
must be preserved (“Yasukuni wa hitsuyō nano da” 靖国は必要なのだ).36 
　　She also attributes her change in perspective to be based in part on the religious teaching she 
received in Catholic schools. As she explained in the earlier 2005 article: “On August 15 this year, 
my husband and I will visit Yasukuni Shrine. Some say that it is not right for me, as a Catholic, to 
do so. My reply is that one of the things I learned from the British and German nuns at the convent 
33 Umehara Takeshi 梅原猛, “Itsuka kita michi” いつか来た道, Kyōto shinbun, 5 January 2014.
34  Sono Ayako, “I Will Visit Yasukuni,” Japan Echo, December 2005, pp. 51–54, translated and abridged from 
“Yasukuni ni mairimasu,” Shokun!, September 2005 (Bungei Shunjūsha), pp. 36–41. See Breen (2009, pp. 114–16) 
for another discussion of the shift in Sono’s perspective and the pro-Yasukuni views of her husband, Miura Shumon, 
another Catholic intellectual.
35 Sono 2005b, p. 53.
36  Sono 2012, pp. 228–30. Breen (2009, p. 115) has also noted the impact of this veteran’s personal story on the 
change in Sono’s position.
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school I attended was, ‘If you can, fulfill other people’s wishes.’ The thinking behind this precept 
can be found in the epistles of Saint Paul.”37 In this case, Sono has clearly prioritized the “wishes” of 
veterans and members of the Bereaved Families Association. But one can legitimately inquire why 
this empathetic approach is not extended to her neighbors in Korea and China, who find Yasukuni 
Shrine’s memorialization of Class A war criminals as oﬀensive, or to those Buddhist and Christian 
Japanese who are deeply troubled by the enshrinement of their family members without permission.38 
　　Turning to the issue of patriotic education, Sono, along with her husband, Miura, are clearly 
among the LDP’s strongest supporters. Part 1 of her 2011 book—Kyōiku wa kyōsei kara hajimaru—
that is, “education starts with coercion,” certainly reflects her strong support for the education policies 
and reforms that have accompanied the revision of the Fundamental Education Law in 2006.39 In 
this section of Tamashii o yashinau kyōiku, aku kara manabu kyōiku 魂を養う教育 悪から学ぶ教育, 
Sono criticizes the postwar education system for over-emphasizing the cultivation of individuality and 
exercise of individual rights and freedoms. This perspective clearly draws on her husband’s views and 
his earlier book, Nihonjin o dame ni shita kyōiku: Kodomo ni waga shinnen o kyōsei subeshi, in which 
he argues that the postwar system imposed by the American Occupation was a form of brainwashing 
and based on a rejection of Japanese values.40 Given the excessive individualism and loss of Japanese 
values apparent today, Sono and Miura provide strong support of the education reforms now being 
advanced by the LDP government—even if coercion is required and individual rights are diminished. 
　　This brief review of the responses of Umehara and Sono to the Yasukuni Shrine issue and more 
recent initiatives aimed at reshaping public life and institutions indicates that our categories of 
“conservative” and “nationalistic” have been misleading and inadequate. More refined categories are 
clearly needed to make sense of how individuals, groups, and political parties actually line-up and, in 
some cases, change their positions on a range of controversial issues. Umehara and Sono are still both 
widely viewed as conservative public intellectuals, but on many key issues they are clearly poles apart 
and represent very diﬀerent visions for the future of Japan.
37 Sono 2005b, p. 54.
38  The disregard for the feelings of these Asian neighbors appears to be related to a deeper disdain for things foreign 
and a concern to maintain the “purity” of the Japanese people. One of her more recent editorials in the conservative 
Sankei shinbun on “The Labor Shortage and Immigrants,” for example, advocated that Japan adopt an apartheid 
system of separate residential areas for foreign workers who come to Japan to meet the labor shortage. This was 
a lesson she thought could be learned from the experience of South Africa, a proposal that attracted widespread 
attention and criticism. See “Rōdōryoku fusoku to imin” 労働力不足と移民, Sankei shinbun, 11 February 2015.
39 Sono 2011, p. 12. 
40  Miura 1998, pp. 82–98. It is worth noting that Sono is essentially repeating a line from this earlier book by her 
husband: “Subete no kyōiku wa tsutaerubeki mono o oshieru kyōsei kara hajimaru すべての教育は伝えるべきものを
教える強制から始まる (p. 233).
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